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PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
PUBLIC INTEGRITY
J. Patrick Dobel*
POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE. By Dennis Thompson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 263. $25.

Individuals who hold office in liberal and democratic societies need
a coherent account of public integrity to carry out their discretionary
duties. Yet, liberal and democratic theories primarily evolved in opposition to government and therefore granted discretionary power to
public officials very grudgingly and with tremendous constraints. In
both traditions, a viable theory of public integrity that does justice to
the complexity of exercising public office has not developed as yet.
Such a theory would give moral and politically realistic guidance for
the exercise of discretion in public office.
As I employ the term, public integrity encompasses three separate
dimensions of decisionmaking by public officeholders. First, it should
define the official standards and processes to which public servants
hold themselves accountable. These would define the commitments
that frame official judgments. Second, it should account for how personal integrity, initiative, judgment, and responsibility should interact
with official standards. A simple theory of official and hierarchical
subordination of self to the routines, standards, and status of a role
simply would not do justice to the moral reality of oath-bound public
service. Moreover, it would invite inflexibility, timidity, and self-protective bureaucrats. Third and finally, a coherent theory of public integrity should accommodate the range of prudential judgments that
individual officeholders must make to perform their jobs fairly and efficiently. Formalistic theories of official responsibility doom effective
performance by not giving guidance to officials on how to manage or
how to protect a program's budget or otherwise guarantee their institution's integrity in the real political environment.
In this essay, I touch upon each of these three dimensions as reference points in a theory of public integrity. I mainly focus, however,
upon how Dennis Thompson's recently published book of essays,
Political Ethics and Public Office, contributes to integrating personal
responsibility - the second dimension - with the discretion granted
to public officeholders.
The classic theoretical solution to problems of public integrity has
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been to combine elements of democratic sovereignty with hierarchical
accountability. According to this theory, the people as sovereign act
through their institutions to determine all significant political/moral
questions. These questions are then shaped into viable directives embodied in clear and unambiguous regulations or lines of authority that
officials must follow. Public servants then "administer" the laws and
regulations determined by the legislative political process. The integrity of the officials depends on their obeying the laws and responding
to the formal processes of government. While this adherence to democratic government is buttressed by an emphasis upon the virtues of
administrative expertise, continuity, and impartiality, any initiatives
by public servants can be only advisory. According to this ideal, only
the democratic process embodying the popular will can authorize governmental action. All other action is arbitrary. 1
The classical solution poses a number of problems. First, it generates a public officialdom that is reactive, rule-bound, and timid. Second, it depends upon a very pronounced notion of hierarchy that
subverts individual integrity, initiative, and dissent within a governmental organization. Third, it simply does not respond to the realities
of political life because it does not recognize what public servants must
do to accomplish organizational and policy goals. Fourth, by emphasizing formal democracy, it serves the interests of the organized and
powerful, since the reality of the system is that special interests too
often dominate the legislative process. The poor, the unorganized, and
children or future generations are seldom adequately represented.
This theory reduces the ability of public servants to act morally (from
an individual perspective) allowing them to address only issues of procedural fairness and orderly bureaucratic remedies. It leaves little if
any room for an individual sense of responsibility or effective management. Nor does it grant officeholders any independent moral status as
trustees - of authority, expertise, law, or minority rights. Only the
popular will has moral weight.
Other elements of the liberal tradition better provide for a theory
of public integrity than do the purely democratic elements outlined
above. Liberalism demands accountability to the popular will, but
also demands the recognition of human dignity and individual rights.
Liberalism grounds notions of the popular will in human dignity and
individual rights, thus it envisions an accountability to standards not
based simply upon the will of the sovereign people. Public servants
should be loyal to the rule of law and the legitimate procedures by
1. For the most recent expansion of this traditional theory, see J. BURKE, BUREAUCRATIC
RESPONSIBILITY (1986). He attempts to resolve the weaknesses of the model by allowing discretion to be exercised to protect either the democratic process or the "enterprise as a whole." Id. at
41-43 (quoting R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1978)). I will periodically refer
to the book to demonstrate the differences between the traditional theory and the one I argue for
here.
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which laws are enacted, but they also have obligations to the principles
that undergird those processes and that protect individual dignity and
rights. In light of the theories of liberalism, officeholders should hold
themselves accountable to more than the popular will as expressed in
laws and regulations. They should resist or seek to educate or ameliorate the popular will, especially if it subverts standing laws or violates
the dignity and rights of individuals. In this sense, John Rohr's recent
work on bureaucratic ethics articulates a plausible moral understanding of the first dimension of public integrity - the official standards
and procedures to which public officeholders are accountable - which
Rohr calls "regime values." 2
Dennis Thompson's book of essays on political ethics in public life
illuminates the second dimension of a theory of public integrity.
Thompson's book comprises a series of extensively revised, though not
necessarily related, essays, which he has written over the last several
years. The essays sensitively and carefully probe the implications of
incorporating notions of "personal responsibility" in our assessments
of moral political life. In seeking a meaning for "political ethics," he
is looking both for criteria by which citizens can fairly judge public
officials and for standards public officials can use in exercising their
discretion.
Personal responsibility must be a dimension of public integrity because the very notion of bounded judgment presumes a capacity for
personal integrity. An individual of integrity makes commitments
that define her selfhood. A commitment to be bound by rules, then, is
an aspect of personal integrity, one that defines a basic attribute of a
public official's character. These commitments also provide the foundations for an official's own assessments and judgments. The stability
and reliability of such commitments give reality to the idea of a morally responsible self. The individual can make sense of her world and
explain to herself and others the coherence of her actions.
Personal integrity leads to reliability and is a precondition of trust.
This connection between integrity and trust makes oaths possible, and
public office in liberal and democratic life hinges upon the validity of
oaths. Public officials pledge to act according to official constraints
and to accept the directives of the political process. It makes no sense
to grant anyone official power if these oaths cannot be relied upon. 3
2. See generally I. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINIS•
TRATIVE STATE (1986). Rohr provides the most interesting account of how a liberal and demo·
cratic understanding of the American Constitution authorizes discretion for officeholders. Rohr
argues that public officials act as trustees of existing laws and of basic principles underlying the
laws and constitutional order. These principles are spelled out in, among other places, Supreme
Court decisions. Both sources, existing law and underlying principles, give officials independent
bases to judge and act which are not reducible to formal lines of authority or obedience to superi·
ors. See also I. ROHR, ETHICS FOR BUREAUCRATS: AN EssAY ON LAW & VALUES (1978).
3. I. ROHR, supra note 2, at 186-94 (demonstrating the central role oath-taking has in con·
necting individual·integrity and government service).
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The validity of the individual's promise depends upon the informed and voluntary nature of the promise. Individuals must follow
personal standards of integrity when agreeing to act within official
constraints. It is not clear that any oath can require individuals to
disregard completely the foundational personal commitments that in
fact gave life to his or her public commitment. Rather, the promise
can be seen as a warrant for continuous personal scrutiny of one's own
conduct in relation to the changing conditions of office to ensure that
the conditions still hold.
Government, then, can be understood as an endeavor in which
one's actions are ultimately judged in light of the standards of personal
integrity that lead the governed to grant the endeavor legitimacy. A
series of fundamental premises underlies both personal integrity and
governmental claims to legitimacy,4 and judgments based on these link
the personal and the public. This is the relationship Thompson examines in his book, arguing that officials are "expected to promote the
general values we share as well as the distinctive values that inhere in
the duties of their particular offices" (p. 4). The moral power of office
and oath-bound discretion depend upon individual integrity, and demand that officeholders see themselves both as persons who "have
rights and obligations that all citizens share," and as officials "judged
by different principles, or principles differently interpreted, than those
applied to persons who act for themselves and for less inclusive
groups." 5
In these essays, Thompson insists that individuals matter more
than official roles, and that they should be assigned praise and blame
as individuals in their exercise of public office. "Political ethics, as
presented here, resists the growing tendency to deny responsibility to
persons, and the complementary tendency to attribute it to collectivities of various kinds" (p. 5). The first essay is a discussion of the problem of "dirty hands," which presumes a tension between general
moral values and problematic political actions (pp. 11-40). Another
essay addresses individual responsibility even when routines and
"many hands" are involved (pp. 40-65), while another examines the
advantages of using criminal negligence categories to judge public officials and avoid the limits of purely hierarchial and collective responsi4. For a thoughtful argument about the connectedness of the two realms, see Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 75-91 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
Stuart Hampshire in the same volume provides a way of seeing that public morality imperatives
are in fact built upon and remain subject to basic moral considerations which private judgment
can generate. Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY,
supra, at 23-54.
5. P. 4. Cf J. BURKE, supra note 1, at 55-99, 164-74. Burke argues that no common principle connects the two realms. Individuals are only allowed to refer to a common morality if the
standard is specified in law by the democratic process. Burke specifically rejects the use of other
principles to augment judgment, arguing instead that public officials should return to the authorizers for greater specification.
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bility (pp. 66-95). Other essays address the private lives of public
officials (pp. 123-47), the multiple tensions in legislative ethics (pp. 96122), and some more substantive problems such as individual responsibility (pp. 123-47), paternalism (pp. 148-77), and social experimentation (pp. 178-202).
This theme of personal responsibility dominates the essays. As
Thompson puts it, "[a]n offiqial is morally responsible for an outcome
only if (1) the official's actions or omissions are a cause of the outcome;
and (2) these actions or omissions are not done in ignorance or under
compulsion" (p. 47). He uses a "deliberately weak" criterion of causal
responsibility - "[a] person qualifies as a cause if the outcome would
not have happened but for the person's act or omission" (p. 47). In
doing this, he greatly extends personal responsibility and denies most
of the usual excuses people use to escape responsibility. But this
stance is balanced by several other concerns.
First, although Thompson acknowledges that ethics is a reflective
discipline that seeks impartial and disinterested standpoints, he argues
that political ethics can be understood best as midrange principles derived by a dialogue with concrete cases. The ethical standards, then,
do not dictate but rather should provide "a set of factors that citizens
as well as officials consider as they deliberate about decisions and policies" (p. 7). These midrange principles evolve from an understanding
of the situational and mediated nature of politics. "[P]olitical ethics is
better conceived as a conflict between the different demands that ethics
itself makes on politics" (p. 2). Such principles are necessarily unstable and contextual. (Indeed this book will frustrate moralists looking
for clear-cut principles that apply to all cases.)
Second, Thompson asks that ethical criteria be realistic and nseful.
Each discussion identifies in an almost overly modest way appropriate
standards to judge actions contextually. He furthermore asserts that
all political ethics are exercised "with others." Any political ethic
must account for the limits imposed by collegial authorship, public
accountability, and the need to persuade and implement noncoercively
(pp. 7-10). In all this, the book avoids the overly rationalistic and
hectoring tone that characterizes so much moral thinking about politics. Neither does he resort to Niehburian hand-wringing about sin
and the limits of ethics in political life. Rather the book is an effort to
regain thoughtful ethical insight over political action.
Thompson's discussion of legislative ethics, in which he painstakingly examines the multiple moral positions a legislator must assess if
he or she is to be effective, exemplifies this approach (pp. 96-122). A
purely rationalistic ethic might argue that legislators should only be
driven by their conception of the common good. But a political ethic
that carefully examines all the moral and practical dimensions involved will not bind legislators so, for legislators are also bound to
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consider the individual interests of constituents. Moreover, legislators
must also distinguish constituents' expressed preferences from what
members believe to be the real interests at stake based upon their experience and judgment (pp. 99-102). Legislators must decide how much
they owe to colleagues or party allies, since coalitions are necessary to
get legislation passed. They also need to assess what role they can best
play in a particular legislature given their own talents and interests.
They might want to be rabble-rousers, conciliators, or statesmen. To
judge each of these contexts fairly Thompson maps out what realistic
requirements of generality, autonomy, and publicity would look like in
legislative life.
Thompson lays out the range of judgments legislators make and
then explains how they operate. He chides legislators to take more
seriously their own task of representing constituents who do not vote
or are otherwise powerless. He points out that claims to institutional
legitimacy also require legislators to protect better the institution's integrity by policing themselves more consistently. These concerns for
institutional legitimacy and concrete reality lead him to suggest that
public financing floors make considerable moral and political sense for
legislatures while avoiding the predictable problems of other schemes
(pp. 114-16).
In one of his many complex assessments, Thompson argues that
we should see trading votes, protecting power, and lobbying colleagues
as ethically valid actions. But he recognizes as a condition that these
should be done in ways that do not compromise legislators' ability to
evaluate important legislation on its merits. In other words, effectiveness should not compromise moral integrity (pp. 97-113).
The key to establishing personal responsibility as a component of a
theory of public integrity lies in Thompson's insistence that officeholders are real persons with personal histories that carry across official
roles (pp. 49-65). Thompson demonstrates that responsibility is not
confined just to office and hierarchical relations. For example, he
points out that former New York City Mayor Abe Beame should not
really be blamed for actions he had to take to bring under control the
fiscal crisis he inherited. But that does not end Thompson's assessment. He points out that Beame, who served as controller, budget
director, and assistant budget director before his term as mayor,
should carry a great share of the blame for the accounting practices
and policies that precipitated the crisis (pp. 62-63).
As further illustration of this, he defends a number of common
moral intuitions about individuals in large institutions: persons who
protest and fight a policy are less responsible than those who pushed
it; those who have more resources to act are more responsible than
those with less; those with more knowledge or access are more responsible than those with less; those who should have known or acted by
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virtue of their office and did not act are also responsible. 6
This approach contributes to a theory of public integrity by
strengthening the moral resources available to a public servant. In a
classic problem, individuals who try to remedy incompetence, illegality, or policy problems can find themselves transferred or demoted. A
formal insistence upon office and hierarchy as the basis of responsibility simply ends the problem. Instead, Thompson insists that personal
responsibility inheres across roles and gives the individual officeholder
good reasons to work to rectify the mistakes she knows about. For
example, Ernst Fitzgerald, the Air Force budget analyst who blew the
whistle on the cost overruns of the C-5A, continued to act even though
he was harassed and transferred. Recognition of personal responsibility at this level would also provide a welcome way to impute criminal
responsibility to superiors who harassed such officials (pp. 85-86).
This focus on personal responsibility also helps individuals avoid
another pathology of bureaucratic and public life. Too often the genealogy of an outcome involves what Thompson calls the problem of
"many hands" (pp. 40-65): the procedures that create wrongs or lead
to failed policies are the responsibility of too many individuals. The
actual people who carry them out can each deflect responsibility.
Thompson insists that those who participate in formulating routines
or setting bureaucratic precedents are responsible in a morally meaningful way and remain responsible for them. He argues that those
with the knowledge and power to effect change are culpable and that
even those who know of wrongs or harms but do not have power have
an obligation to work to persuade others to change it (pp. 40-95).
Thompson's focus on individuals over time with skills, expertise, and
knowledge demonstrates that moral responsibility defies the traditional categorization of office and official responsibility.
This focus upon personal responsibility can energize a theory of
public integrity and public management. It expands obligations of
public servants by focusing upon their greater knowledge, skill, and
position to know and act. This warrants them to evaluate critically
their actions as public managers and empowers them to rectify harms
and accomplish good when they can. It challenges the common excuses designed to insulate individuals from both positive initiative and
serious responsibility for their actions. Any theory of public service or
public management which wants a robust notion of initiative and action needs to make the link that Thompson argues for.
This focus also subverts another typical bureaucratic technique to
6. Pp. 41-49. Cf. J. Burke, supra note 1, at 55-125. Burke spends most of his time arguing
that one's actions should be constrained to one's formal duties. He would permit very few unauthorized actions. Even identification of harms or wrongs are constrained by one's limited job
competence. This limits what could have been otherwise a very expansive notion of loyalty to the
"enterprise as a whole" to one's limited domain within an agency or burea~.
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avoid responsibility. In real organizations, influence and power fl.ow
along informal as much as formal lines. If persons possess knowledge
of wrongs and can affect outcomes within their informal networks, this
emphasis upon real personal responsibility warrants them to act beyond confines of hierarchical office to rectify the wrongs consistent
with the goals of their real power and responsibility.
For instance, during the Vietnam war George Ball's official duties
encompassed Western European Affairs. But by virtue of his acc-ess to
President Lyndon Johnson and his own predilections, he became the
major focus of opposition to the escalation of the Vietnam War. Yet,
Ball responded to questions as to why he did not resign, having failed
to prevent the escalation, by arguing that it was not his ''job."
Thompson rightly acknowledges that "[o]ne cannot be culpable for all
the policies on which one could have had any influence," and suggests
that "it's not my job" would be an appropriate excuse most times (p.
57). Ball, however, was designated by Lyndon Johnson as a special
advisor and had a privileged role in the deliberations on Vietnam policies. He in fact relished and took pride in that role. 7 Thompson reminds us that when important values are at stake or others are not
doing their jobs, "some officials may be obliged to do more if the circumstances are exceptional" (p. 56). This is a warrant to evaluate
more extensively and more harshly than is mandated by purely formal
and hierarchical standards (pp. 47-60).
Such robust notions of responsibility provide great moral resources
for individuals to resist illegal, unjust, or inefficient actions. They also
provide good reasons for individuals to initiate change. However,
these same resources can also inspire dangerous abuses of power. The
Iran-Contra affair was initiated by a number of highly motivated individuals spurred on by self-righteous belief. They, especially Oliver
North, went far beyond the confines of their jobs and chains of authority and used informal networks to effectuate highly questionable
policies. 8
The Iran-Contra affair should remind us of the importance of the
basic reference points for officeholders' actions. These remain the laws
and procedures of the political order. These reference points mean
that discretion is not unlimited but should occur within a deliberative
traditions and procedures with their own logic and limits. Personal
judgments and initiatives in government must be tested by public deliberation and accountability. This domesticates personal moral initiative while keeping it alive in government. Policies and judgments
7. See G. BALL, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATIERN: MEMOIRS chs. 24-26 (1982). See also
L. BERMAN, PLANNING A TRAGEDY: THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM
(1982).
8. H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority and
Additional Views).
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must persuade others and connect to established meanings and procedures and law. This prevents them from becoming arbitrary and
tyrannical. 9
In this light, the major issue for public integrity in the Iran-Contra
affair is the problem of secrecy and intergovernmental deception. The
actors deceived the Congress, the president, and the secretaries of defense and state. The pervasive use of secrecy violated the basic precondition of democratic accountability and contributed to both bad and
illegal policy. In this regard, I think Thompson's approach could have
been helped by a less modest account which laid out more systematically the norms that would have foundational status for public service
in a liberal democracy. These norms then needed to be linked to both
personal responsibility and broader constitutional values. In this, the
book could have used a good summary chapter pulling Thompson's
underlying substantive theses together; also each chapter could have
used a stronger analytic summary.
The central role of publicity in political ethics is one standard that
does run through all of Thompson's work. Thompson consistently
minimizes the conditions when secrecy or deception can be legitimately used by officeholders. He requires prior procedures and standards to be in place to determine when secrecy is legitimate and to set
time and oversight constraints, and suggests that public records ought
to be made available after the fact so that retrospective accountability
can occur. 10
Even here, Thompson points out, absolute prohibitions seldom
9. For a vehement argument that all use of "ethical" judgments not strictly bounded by clear
law and authorized regulations constitute an arbitrary and illicit use of official power, see J.
BURKE, supra note 1, at 7-37, 126-41.
I think Burke misunderstands the nature of "arbitrary." He suggests that because moral
controversies over rights or principles cannot bring definitive and consensual closure, individual
leaders' decisions on such matters are arbitrary and illicit. But arbitrariness is best characterized
by giving reasons which are not appropriate or cannot be accepted by others. To avoid arbitrariness, one need not rule out recourse to justifications per se, but only to justifications which cannot persuade or be made consistent with the world of legitimate justification. To the extent that
public officials utilize rights language or common-good language to identify new harms or
wrongs and propose actions to rectify them, to initiate discussion, and to aggressively bring issues
to the attention of interested groups or the public at large or the various branches of the authorizing process, they do not act arbitrarily. They place their reasons in a public domain and link
their reasons to justifications understood by the population. The incompleteness of the reasons
should not disbar them from use for justification as long as they remain plausibly connected and
open to public acceptance or repudiation. For a compelling account of how moral discourse and
legal discourse can interact in a nonarbitrary way, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
Burke also misunderstands the difference between advocacy and tyranny within bureaucracies. Often public officials' knowledge, skills, and familiarity with the problems they address give
them the capacity and arguably the responsibility to bring these problems to the attention of the
government or the people. Bureaucrats can then advocate extensions or modifications of plans
and programs within the public rules of decision by persuading members of Congress or the
executive or the courts or even interest groups. Thus, while acting to enforce existing rules, they
can work for change via the real world processes at their disposal, not confined to the austere
formal hierarchy advocated in Burke.
10. See chapters l, 4, and 5.
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work nor can they anticipate all the possible events of politics. Similarly, at times mediation and oversight break down, while retrospective accountability occurs only after the damage is done. He accepts
this reality of political life, but sees secrecy and deception as the fundamental dangers to the moral legitimacy of democratic politics. He
calls for strengthened procedures and asks officials to internalize notions of generalizability to constrain their judgments. As the IranContra affair reminds us, his concerns are legitimate on all accounts.
The publicity requirement clearly emerges from his qualified acceptance of democratic ethical principles. "Many of the disputes in political ethics, even about fundamental principles, must be resolved finally
or at least partly through some form of the democratic process" (p. 3).
While he does not go into why democracy deserves such deference, he
does suggest that such a process must not be simply "majority rule" or
procedures that merely reflect the power of some citizens. Democracy
cannot be relied upon to resolve such disputes legitimately without
collective deliberation and "publicity."
Thompson makes a very persuasive case that publicity is so important for democratic accountability that the private lives of many public
officials should be open to extensive public scrutiny (pp. 123-47). He
suggests several contextual standards. First, the higher the office, the
more legitimate pervasive scrutiny is. Second, to the extent that a
causal or symbolic connection exists between personal behavior and
the requirements of the office, scrutiny is legitimate. He cites the example of Attorney General Griffin Bell's membership in a discriminatory club as an example of such a connection. Third, all officials ought
to be subject to such scrutiny and, in an interesting argument, he denies distinctions between elected, appointed, and career officials.
Fourth, he suggests that for career officials the scrutiny is generally
legitimately kept to their superiors rather than the public. Fifth, to
the extent that a person makes his or her personal life part of a public
image, he or she is open to scrutiny (pp. 129-40). At the same time,
consistent with the careful nature of his analysis, Thompson presents
some limits and constraints on the ways this scrutiny can legitimately
be exercised by government officials and the public (pp. 140-47).
In a related and central argument, he contends that the classic paradox of "dirty hands" can be dissolved by the public nature of democratic action. According to Thompson the only time it inheres in its
full sense is when public officials act secretly (pp. 11-39). The dirty
hands paradox argues that public officials must sometimes do wrong in
order to do right. 11 The problem can be dissolved by utilitarian theo11. See generally N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 90-114 (G. Bull trans. 1961); M. WEBER,
Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77 (H. Gerth & W. Mills
eds. 1970); Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160
(1973).
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ries of public morality by simply weighing up the aggregate good while
dropping out the bad from the final assessments. It can also be denied
by those who argue that public life has two different levels of nonrelated morality, so no paradox exists.
Because Thompson sees two moralities linked by common premises and principles, with real humans at the interpretive center, he accepts the paradox of wrong for the cause of good. Yet, even as he
accepts its existence, he argues that the paradox is not as severe as it
seems. He points out that in a democracy, officials act "for us" and
"with others." Consequently, any guilt or obligation implicated in the
action is shared by all citizens, not just the official. This accomplishes
two things. First, it gets away from the paralyzing assignment of expiation to public officials acting as "suffering servants" or moral scapegoats for the community. Second, it shifts the discussion to issues of
compensatory justice for those "wronged" by the actions that served
the broader public good.12
Both are important changes in the way we view this problem.
However, it is troubling that a theory that has as its basic focus the
reinsertion of individual responsibility into assessments of governmental effectiveness dissolves this focus in solving the Machiavellian paradox. If a person can simply spread the blame for his actions to
everyone within the society, the actual assessment of responsibility will
be severely diluted. Yet Thompson elsewhere specifically rejects the
practice of diluting the blame and praise by just this technique of making everyone and no one responsible (pp. 44-49).
He makes this claim about the "dirty hands" problem in order to
deflate the Lone Ranger mentality of moral assessment in public life,
and to devise an ethic that accounts for the collegial and realistic
dimensions of public life. But it is not clear that the paradox is or
should be resolved by diluting individual responsibility. I think it can
be viewed another way, using the insights of Thompson's discussion of
legislative leadership.
In Thompson's view, each legislator has two different obligations:
to serve the common good and to serve her individual constituents.
Legislative action depends upon persuading and making deals with fellow legislators. Thus one can defend stands one takes based upon
these legitimate contextual claims of being effective and responding to
collegial and constituent demands.
Thompson argues further that members can become active
mediators among views of the common good of their colleagues and
constituents. "We can think of this creation as occurring in a reiterated, four-step process: representatives express particular views, modify the views in light of what other representatives say, act on the
12. Pp. 11-24. It is interesting that whereas Max Weber addressed this paradox as inherent
in the classic hierarchial model, Burke's analysis dissolves the paradox.
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modified views, and then seek to justify them to constituents" (p. 107).
Thus elected officials become leaders and educators of public opinion
and engage in a continuous dialogue with colleagues and constituents.
One might easily expand this to include all public officials. The reality
of public life is that the success of most programs depends upon a few
individuals who are deeply committed and skilled.
Thompson's discussion of legislative ethics reveals the activist preference-changing dimension of official responsibility. If we apply this
insight to the "dirty hands" discussion, then "the individual responsibility for official actions may be greater than Thompson indicates, especially where the people trust a given public official and agree with
her less because they think the policy is good and more because they
trust her personal judgment and integrity.
Compensation by the polity for harms done to attain a public good
is vitally important. But the burden for avoiding harm should fall
more heavily upon the leaders and officeholders. To the extent that
leaders misrepresent or push hard for an issue or use their personal
credibility to maintain a policy, as Robert McNamara did for the escalation of the Vietnam war, it might be doubly important to keep the
blame for such actions squarely on the shoulders of the leaders. 13 This
also places responsibility to initiate and keep alive discussions of compensation on those participants.
The dissolution of the paradox also depends upon the consent of
the citizenry, but Thompson again underestimates the active and responsible role leaders have in shaping consent. Many citizens who do
consent may do so only because it is retrospective. They may not have
consented if they had been consulted. Some citizens, even if consulted,
may have dissented. Many others may consent because they trusted
the advocates of the policy. In these cases, the paradox for the officials
does and should remain. While the blame might be legitimately extended to those who consent beforehand or actively benefit and consent, Thompson's own focus upon the reality and centrality of
personal responsibility can remain largely intact.
While an officeholder's standards of personal integrity provide a
basis for self-scrutiny and assessment, a basis vital to keeping alive
initiative and humanity in official life, as Thompson clearly acknowledges, personal values should not dominate official decisions. But
when official decisionmaking is completely insulated from personal
moral life, moral squalor is the normal result. In such a world no
moral resources exist for individual officials to innovate or to resist
13. Professor Lea Vaughn has suggested to me that one should be very careful about relying
on the possibility of compensation. If leaders are not always prone to place compensation on the
political agenda, majorities will not necessarily be sympathetic to the need for compensation.
The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II is an interesting case in point. The
policy was created by a small number of officials who shaped public opinion. That policy, and
the harm flowing from it, took 40-plus years to rectify. See P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
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unjust policies. They have no moral reference points outside of the
closed, officially recognized system. In a constitutional order where
fundamental values of human dignity and individual rights depend for
protection upon a basic personal commitment to the constitutional order itself, personal integrity becomes doubly important. Only the personal references can give one the critical distance and moral courage
to work to resist or change such deprivations. It is doubly important
that this notion of individual responsibility be kept alive because it
prevents a person from abandoning critical judgment and handing it
over to "routines" of offi.ce. 14
One weakness in Thompson's analysis is that it does not pursue the
third dimension of public integrity, political prudence. As the essays
reestablish personal responsibility in the world of public justification,
they often touch upon the importance of contextual judgments of a
prudential nature, but they never systematically pursue these. But
even individuals who consider themselves personally responsible for
their actions in government and give great initial weight to regime values do not possess all the moral and judgmental resources they need
for public integrity.is
Prudence is vital because with rare exceptions all standards of action, all laws and moral claims underdetermine their outcomes. This
becomes especially so where several norms or goals are at stake. Additionally, the nature of language and authority suggests that the actual
meaning of directives in context is almost always subject to negotiation
and judgment. 16 Very few directives or even direct orders are determinatively explicit to cover all contingencies and requirements of action
in all times. When more than one goal or moral or legal right impinges upon an issue, unless specifically and clearly lexical in their
orderings, then judgments will have to be made about the relative priority or the weighting among priorities given to each goal. The lived
cognitive reality of institutional life means that individuals always ini14. Pp. 70-89. Thompson's discussion of using negligence criteria to assess personal responsibility in public organizations is one of the most creative and insightful sections of the book.
Here he extends the active notion to include stronger anticipatory notions as well as scathing
criticisms of the dangers and ineffectiveness of notions of pure hierarchical and collective responsibility in organizations.
15. This term builds upon that used in J. ROHR, ETHICS FOR BUREAUCRATS: AN EssAY ON
LAw AND VALUES (1978) supra note 2. He refers to the values which a society has consensually
agreed upon to govern official conduct in a particular area. These values do not reduce to the
exact law itself, but are reflected in the procedures, discourse, and especially the court decisions.
Rohr also strongly believes that a set of basic values embodied in the Constitution should also
inform judgments in difficult situations. Lastly, he sees the processes which develop these as
central and deserving of loyalty and deference.
16. For a discussion of the interaction between moral claims, background principles of the
culture and constitution, and laws, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 9. He argues that the nature of
history and language require that law and morality be seen as engaged in a consistent interpretive
dialogue where determinative decisions are framed by deliberation within the system of constitutional principles and laws.
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tiate, negotiate, and judge meanings as they exercise discretion. No
amount of overdetermination or hierarchical subordination would
solve this problem.17
The activity of governance and effective implementation of underdetermined directives has its own agenda of concerns and skills.
Prudence in the areas of building support, handling budgets, and gaining efficiency is required to meet the obligations of public office given
the realities of public life. First, the process of lawmaking involves
building coalitions, and coalition-building usually means putting multiple purposes into a law without clearly prioritizing them. Thus, laws
are usually underdetermined, not only to gain support of a coalition
but also because premature exactness can hamstring effective enforcement and override legitimate contextual concerns. Second, the actual
enactment of a law is a largely symbolic act; it is more a pledge of
effort than a guarantee of result. The result depends upon budget,
management, and continuing political support for the law. Every time
insufficient resources are given to achieve multiple purposes, political
prudence must be exercised. Individuals charged with performing official duties will need to exercise some discretion to build support for
their efforts, build coalitions, and maintain their budgets over time. 18
This is so because in the American system, multiple sources of accountability exist. The actual formulation and oversight of policy depends not just upon the vested discretion of career public servants, but
upon political appointees, elected executives, legislative committees,
and courts. All are involved in oversight and formulation of the explicit purposes of a law. Thus individual officials possess considerable
discretion in where to look for accountability in shared powers. Additionally the actual alliances to pass laws and sustain budgets emerge
from wide-ranging and permeable issue networks. The blunt moral
and prudential reality of political life is that one who is given a charge
cannot accomplish it over time without exercising discretion to build
outside political support.
Any public servant who is charged with creating or overseeing a
program has the warrant to sustain the program's existence and viability, for without these the goals cannot be accomplished. An individual
who ignores the process of building support for her program basically
jeopardizes the program and its ability to sustain itself in the political
process of a liberal democracy. In all these cases, indiviqual public
servants will and should exercise wide discretion over a vast range of
moral and legal subjects. Thus, a theory of public integrity which
slights any of these three dimensions - regime commitments, per17. See generally M. HARMON, ACTION THEORY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1981); H.
MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS (1983).
18. See generally M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); T. Low1, THE
END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).
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sonal responsibility, and political prudence - would be inadequate as
a basis for evaluating the requirements of public service.19
It would also have been helpful if Thompson provided a means by
which to weigh prudential judgments against personal moral claims.
The section on legislative ethics illustrates the importance and weight
of such judgments most clearly. Other sections are not as much help.
For instance, in the chapter on paternalism he suggests that aid-inkind programs are objectionable given certain assumptions about the
autonomy of the individuals receiving such aid (pp. 170-72). But he
ignores the prudential dimension of these programs: it is much easier
to build coalitions for in-kind aid for the poor. In the case of food
stamps, Farm Belt senators who would not normally support welfare
assistance become abiding supporters. Is such a tradeoff between the
prudential concern to build a coalition and a violation of individual
autonomy justified? I believe Thompson would suggest that it is but
gives no framework for assessing such tradeoffs.
At this stage we need some broader mapping of the relative values
at stake or some way to get a priority assessment of the relation between core values of public integrity and less central ones. This would
cue us as to tradeoffs one should be willing to make. But these are
concerns that would complement Thompson's basic project, not negate the import of the essays themselves.
I have argued that a theory of public integrity should view public
officials as responsible political and moral actors within a governmental system with multiple sources of accountability and subject to underdetermined goals. An emphasis upon individual responsibility
19. John Rohr demonstrates the legitimacy of looking to multiple sources of accountability
in a system where sovereignty itself is divided and shared. J. ROHR, supra note 2, at 13·54, 115·
94. The absolute importance of tending to the budget for the welfare of the program and the
problems which can emerge when "bureaucratic politics" and budgetary concerns override pro·
gram integrity are discussed in A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
(4th ed. 1984). For the importance of coalition-building to sustain programs and budgets, see F.
ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, PoLmcs AND PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 1984).
It is interesting how limited the classic model is in this area. Burke argues that the bureau·
crat facing unclear directives or insufficient funds should return to the authorizing process to ask
for a clarification of the goals or an increase in funds. J. BURKE, supra note 1, at ch. 5. But
politics always involves unclear goals and insufficient funds. A public servant who followed
Burke's advice would lose credibility and effectiveness.
More interesting is the insufficient aid classic theory gives to an officeholder committed to a
law. Suppose a conscientious bureaucrat who is committed to implementing a program faces an
appointed leader who regularly negates effective action and cuts budgets in a way designed to
hamstring enforcement. Under a more robust theory like Thompson's or Rohr's, the individual
could fight to protect the integrity of the program and the public purposes of which he or she is a
trustee.
In Burke's formal democratic model, the individual has little recourse but to complain to the
superior or resign. He cites approvingly an official who resigned and ineffectually went public
over Secretary of Labor Donovan's crippling of an agency. Id. at 191-93. A more realistic and
helpful theory of integrity would enable the individual to go to the courts or convince friends to
go to the courts to get injunctions. He or she could leak to the press to build outside support or
use allies in Congress to pressure actions and save budgets. The traditional theory as Burke
understands and revises it, simply misunderstands the moral importance of implementation.
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encourages officials not only to obey the laws, but to understand law as
an ongoing dialogue among themselves and other bureaucrats, executives, legislators, and judges. This gives individual officeholders a warrant to act, evaluate, and initiate on the basis of their moral
assessments, plausibly and publically debated. Dennis Thompson's
ideas inform this approach, and provide a far more plausible context
for a theory of public integrity than does the traditional democratic
sovereign model. Public integrity, then, resembles a triangulation in
which an individual would operate within three dimensions. As the
range of actions derived from each reference point overlap, the most
morally, politically, legally, and prudentially defensible solutions
would start to emerge. When they don't intersect, the greatest weight
should be given to those suggested by the regime values and procedures, but it warrants the official to work to change the outcome
within the framework.
Public integrity begins with regime values. This is supplemented
by a robust sense of personal accountability as emphasized by Thompson. Finally, a theory of public integrity needs a stronger sense of
political prudence. The intersection of these dimensions should give
effective ranges of acceptable answers to questions of discretion and
would provide public officials with moral resources to govern realistically and morally.

